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EFFICIENCY LOSS OF MIXED EQUILIBRIUM ASSOCIATED 
WITH ALTRUISTIC USERS AND LOGIT-BASED 
STOCHASTIC USERS IN TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
ABSTRACT
The efficiency loss of mixed equilibrium associated with 
two categories of users is investigated in this paper. The first 
category of users are altruistic users (AU) who have the same 
altruism coefficient and try to minimize their own perceived 
cost that assumed to be a linear combination of selfish com-
ponent and altruistic component. The second category of us-
ers are Logit-based stochastic users (LSU) who choose the 
route according to the Logit-based stochastic user equilib-
rium (SUE) principle. The variational inequality (VI) model is 
used to formulate the mixed route choice behaviours associ-
ated with AU and LSU. The efficiency loss caused by the two 
categories of users is analytically derived and the relations 
to some network parameters are discussed. The numerical 
tests validate our analytical results. Our result takes the re-
sults in the existing literature as its special cases.
KEY WORDS
efficiency loss, mixed equilibrium, variational inequality, sys-
tem optimum, demand ratio
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1950s, it has been well known that the out-
come of the user’s selfish behaviour is generally not 
identical with the system optimum (SO). However, the 
gap was not known for a long time. In 1999 Koutsou-
pias and Papadimitriou presented the efficiency loss 
(price of anarchy) to measure the inefficiency for the 
user’s selfish behaviour and defined it as the largest 
ratio between the total cost of Nash equilibrium and 
the total cost of an optimal solution achieved by cen-
tralized control [1]. Later, Roughgarden and Tardos in-
troduced it into the transportation network and used it 
to quantify the gap between the user equilibrium (UE) 
and the SO [2]. After that, quantifying the efficiency 
loss of user’s selfish behaviour in the transportation 
context has been an important aspect in the traffic sci-
ence. The researchers have extended the above works 
in different aspects [3-9].
In the studies mentioned above, the authors as-
sumed that each user has the same route-choose prin-
ciple. In other words, each user tries to minimize her/
his actual (perceived) travel cost. Several researchers 
studied the network simultaneously with heteroge-
neous users where different category users have dif-
ferent route-choose principles. Haurie and Marcotte 
investigated the network users belonging to some non-
cooperative Cournot–Nash (CN) players, where the us-
ers belonging to the same CN player can cooperate 
fully with each other and different players will compete 
with each other. The users of one CN player aim to 
minimize their own total cost while competing with the 
users of other players [10]. Harker examined that the 
network users can be divided into different CN play-
ers and UE player and obtained a new network equi-
librium model [11]. Recently, Yang and Zhang studied 
the existence of anonymous link tolls in network with 
UE-CN mixed equilibrium behaviours [12]. Liu et al. 
are concerned with the efficiency loss caused by the 
mixed equilibrium behaviour in a system with the ad-
vanced traveller information systems (ATIS), the users 
equipped with ATIS choose their route to minimize the 
total travel cost, while the unequipped ones make the 
route choice decisions on the base of minimizing their 
individual travel cost [13]. Guo and Yang first proved 
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that any Pareto optimum can be decentralized into 
multiclass user equilibrium by positive anonymous link 
tolls. They further quantified the system performance 
gap when optimized by the two different criteria [14]. 
Yu and Huang investigated the efficiency loss of trans-
portation network with UE-CN mixed equilibrium [15]. 
Karakostas et al. studied the effect of oblivious users 
using, as the measure of network performance, its 
price of anarchy [16].
Experiments have shown that even for simple 
games in controlled environments, the participants do 
not act selfishly; their behaviour can be either altruistic 
or malicious [17-18]. This paper aims to quantify the ef-
ficiency loss of a network with two categories of users. 
The AU choose their routes according to the UE princi-
ple by their perceived cost that is a linear combination 
of a selfish component and an altruistic component. 
The selfish component is the user’s own actual trav-
el cost, and the altruistic component is the increase 
in the travel cost the user causes to others (precise 
definition is given in Section 3). The LSU choose their 
routes aims to minimize their perceived costs accord-
ing to the SUE principle. Section 2 introduces the nota-
tion and assumptions. Section 3 obtains the equiva-
lent VI formulation of the mixed equilibrium associated 
with AU and LSU. Section 4 binds the efficiency loss of 
the mixed equilibrium by VI approach and investigates 
the relation between the upper bound and the network 
parameters. In section 5 a simple numerical example 
is provided. Finally, Section 6 gives the conclusions.
2. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
A transportation network ,G N A= ^ h is composed 
of a finite set of nodes N, and a finite set of directed 
links A. Let W be the set of all Origin-Destination (OD) 
pairs, R - the set of all paths in the network and Rw  - 
the set of all paths between an OD pair w W! . It is 
assumed that demand dw  between an OD pair w W!  
is a constant. Let d be the vector of demand in the 
transportation network G. Denote the flow on path 
r Rw! , w W!  as frw . Suppose that AU have the same 
altruism coefficient b  and presume that the ratio of AU 
among all the users between each OD pair is identical, 
denoted by m. Denote by frwAU  the flow of AU and by frwLSU  
the flow of LSU on path r Rw! . The vectors of path 
flows by AU and LSU are , , , ,f f ffAU rAU rAU rAU1 1f f/ - +^ h 
and , , , ,f f ffLSU rLSU rLSU rLSU1 1f f/ - +^ h, respectively. By 
vaAU  the AU flow on link a is denoted and vaLSU  is the 
LSU flow on link a, while , , , ,v v vvAU aAU aAU aAU1 1f f= - +^ h 
and , , , ,v v vvLSU aLSU aLSU aLSU1 1f f= - +^ h are the vectors 
of the link flows by AU and LSU, respectively. Vector 
,v vva aAU aLSU/ ^ h has components of all the flows on 
link a and v v va aAU aLSU= +  is the total flow on link a. We 
define ,v v vAU LSU/ ^ h and ,f f fAU LSU/ ^ h. The link travel 
cost function t va a^ h, a A!  is separable, differentiable, 
convex and monotonically increasing with the aggre-
gate link flow va. Denote by t  the vector of link travel 
cost in the transportation network G. The actual travel 
cost of the users on path r Rw!  is




^ h/ , r Rw! , w W!
while 1arwd =  if the path r Rw!  traverses link a A! , 
and 0arwd =  otherwise. The perceived travel cost of 
LSU on path r Rw!  (this travel cost is a psychologi-
cal value; it may be larger than or less than the actual 
travel cost) will be denoted by CrwLSU .
For the sake of convenience, the flow conservation 
conditions and nonnegative constraint conditions are 
summarized as follows:
v faAU rwAU arw
r Rw W w
d=
!!







/ , w W!  wAUn^ h, (2)
f 0rwAU $ , r Rw! , w W! , (3)
v faLSU rwLSU arw
r Rw W w
d=
!!







^ h/ , w W!  wLSUn^ h, (5)
0frwLSU $ , r Rw! , w W! . (6)
where wAUn , wLSUn  is the Lagrange multiplier of equa-
tions (2) and (5), respectively. Assume that
(1) (3)f f satisfying formulasfAU AU AUX = -" ,,
( ) ( )v f 1 3satisfying formulasvAU AU AUX 7= -" ,;
( ) ( )f f 4 6satisfying formulasfLSU LSU LSUX = -" ,, and
( ) ( )v f 4 6satisfying formulasvLSU LSU LSUX 7= -" ,.
Obviously, fAUX , vAUX , fLSUX , vLSUX  are all closed and 
convex sets.
3. MIXED EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
ASSOCIATED WITH AU AND LSU
Experiments in economics have found that the us-
ers behave not entirely selfishly, even in simple games. 
Based on the results of Ledyard [17], Chen and Kempe 
[19], and the definition of the perceived cost of altru-
istic user with altruism coefficient AUb^ h is as follows:
Proposition 1 - For given AUb^ h. ,1 1!b -^ h6 @  and 
for given w W! , there is a path r Rw! , w W!  to min-
imize the perceived cost function
C t v t v vv 1rwAU a a arw
a A
a a a ar
w
a A
b d b d= - + =
! !
l^ ^ ^ ^^h h h h h/ /




b b= - +
! !





is the selfish part of the cost,
t v va a a
a r!
l^^ h h/
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is the altruistic part. t v va a a l^^ h h  denotes the derivative 
with respect to va. Notice that we can rewrite






l^ ^ ^h h h/ / .
Thus, the perceived cost of AUb^ h on link a in 
the network is t t v v t vvaAU a a a a ab= + l^ ^ ^h h h . Notice 
that if AU 0b =^ h  then this coincides with selfish-
ness; AU 1b =^ h  corresponds to complete altruism; 
1AUb =-^ h  means the users are completely spite-
ful. In this paper, we have supposed that AU have the 
same altruism coefficient ,0 1!b 6 @.
The AU aim to minimize their personal perceived 
travel cost under the current routing decisions of the 
LSU, which is equivalent to solve








^ h/ # . (7)
where the variables vaLSU , a A!  are taken as fixed. If 
the function of t vaAU a^ h is strictly increasing by link trav-
el cost function t va a^ h defined before, then the minimi-
zation problem (7) has a unique solution.
The LSU in the transportation network are consid-
ered now. In the SUE state, each utility-maximized user 
always chooses the minimum perceived travel cost 
path for travel [20]. The given path utility UrwLSU  is re-
lated to its travel cost, then UrwLSU  is given by
U C crwLSU rwLSU rwLSU rwi i p=- =- + , r Rw! , w W! . (8)
where CrwLSU  is the random perceived travel cost along 
the path, crwLSU  is the actual travel cost along the path 
as defined before, rwp  is a random term associated 
with the path under consideration and can be consid-
ered to represent the unobservable or unmeasurable 
factors of utility. A positive unit scaling parameter i  is 
related to the standard deviation of the random term 
and measures the sensitivity of path choices to travel 
cost, so crwLSUi-  is the measure utility. If the PrwLSU  de-
notes the probability of the LSU choosing path r Rw! , 
then the utility maximization (perceived travel cost 
minimization) principle implies that
,PrP U U k RrwLSU rwLSU kwLSU w6$ != ^ h, r Rw! , w W! . (9)
This choice probability has the following properties:





/ , w W! . (11)
If the Logit-based model assumes that the random 
terms rwp  in (8) are independently and identically dis-
tributed Gumbel random variables, then the choice 






















/ , r Rw! , w W! . (12)
and the path flow assignment can be given by
f d P1rwLSU w rwLSUm= -^ h , r Rw! , w W! . (13)
The AU choose their paths aiming to minimize their 
perceived cost according to the UE principle and the 
LSU choose their paths aiming to minimize their per-
ceived cost according to the SUE principle. Then, at 
the state of mixed equilibrium associated with AU and 
LSU in the transportation network, the AU (LSU) trav-
el cannot reduce their perceived cost by unilaterally 
changing their choice at the equilibrium. The condition 
of mixed equilibrium associated with AU and LSU in 
transportation network can be formulated as follows 
[20]:























/ , r Rw! , w W! . (15)
satisfying equations (1)-(6), where wAUn  is the minimal 
path perceived cost of OD pair w at mixed equilibrium 
for the AU. The mixed equilibrium can be formulated as 
VI by the following [21].
Lemma 1 - Let , , , ,G d t b m^ h be a mixed instance 
associated with AU and LSU. If the separable link 
travel cost function t va a^ h, a A!  is strictly increasing 
and convex, then mixed equilibrium of the instance 
, , , ,G d t b m^ h is equivalent with finding ,f f fAU LSU=r r r^ h, 















































Proof: If ,f f fAU LSU=r r r^ h is the mixed equilibrium of 
the instance , , , ,G d t b m^ h, then
C ff 0rwAU wAU rwAUn- =r r^^ h h ,























/ , r Rw! , w W! . (18)
By the relation of complementarity problem and VI, 
(17) can be rewritten as
C f ff 0rwAU rwAU rwAU $-r r^ ^h h , r Rw! , w W! . (19)
From (18) next follows [20]:
lnc d













where cw  is the path travel cost in OD pair w W! , 
S cw^ h is the desired minimum perceived travel cost 
[20]. Then frwLSUr  is the solution of the following VI:
lnc d






































































The second term of (22) is zero due to the flow con-
servation condition and the OD demand is constant. 
Then,
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lnc d




















 .fLSU fLSU6 ! Xr  (23)
Thus, in view of (19) and (23), we can obtain that fr  
is the solution of (16).
If ,f f fAU LSU=r r r^ h is the solution of (16), by the Ka-
rush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of VI, we can obtain:
C ff 0rwAU wAU rwAUn- =r r^^ h h , 0C frwAU wAU $n-r^ h ,
 r Rw! , w W!  (24)
lnc d































, r Rw! , w W! . (26)
where wAUn , wLSUn  is the Lagrange multiplier of equa-
tion (2) and (5), respectively. For all f 0rwLSU 2r , r Rw! , 















, r Rw! , w W! . (27)
Thus,
expf d c f1rwLSU w wLSU rwAUm in i= - -r r^ ^^h hh,
 r Rw! , w W! . (28)
Sum up equation (28) and according to the flow 














^ h/ . (29)























/ , r Rw! , w W! . (30)
This completes the proof.
4. EFFICIENCY LOSS OF MIXED 
EQUILIBRIUM ASSOCIATED  
WITH AU AND LSU
Let ,v v v, ,so so AU so LSU= ^ h and v vAso aso= ^ h, a A!  be 
the solution and the aggregate link flow of the follow-
ing optimization problem, respectively:
min t v va a a
a Av! !X
^ h/ , (31)
where vAU vLSU#X X X= . Let T vso^ h measure the mini-
mal total travel cost of the transportation network, i.e., 
T vso^ h is the total travel cost at system optimum. fso , 
vso  are the path flow and link flow at system optimum, 
respectively. Following the definition by Koutsoupias 
and Papadimitriou [1], the efficiency loss of the mixed 
equilibrium behaviour above is formulated as:

























where T T c ff fmix rw rw
r Rw W w
= =
!!
r r r^ ^h h// , or
T T t v v v vvmix a aAU aLSU aAU aLSU
a A
= = + + =
!
r r r r r^ ^ ^h h h/




r r^ h/ .
 T T c ff fSO SO rw SO rwSO
r Rw W w
= =
!!
^ ^h h// , or




^ ^h h/ .
Hence, , , , ,G d t 1$t b m^ h . According to the origi-
nal composition of each OD pair demand, the SO 
path flow , , , ,f f ffSO rSO rSO rSO1 1f f= - +^ h can be decom-
posed into f f,SO AU SOm= , f f1,SO LSU SOm= -^ h  and the 
SO link flow can be decomposed into v v,SO AU SOm= , 
v v1,SO LSU SOm= -^ h . Replace frwAU  by f ,rwSO AU  and replace 



























































t v v t v v v
t v v v
d
















































T T v t v t v
v t v v v
d




a a a a
SO
a A







































If an upper bound for the sum of the last three 
terms on the right hand side (RHS) of (35) can be 
found, then we bind the overall cost inefficiency of the 
mixed equilibrium associated with AU and LSU in the 
transportation network. For the sum of the second and 
the three terms on RHS of (35), its upper bound can 
be obtained by the following. A parameter is defined:









v a a a












r r r r
^
^
^ ^^ ^ ^
h
h
h hh h h . (36)
Note that the denominator on RHS of (36) is given 
and fixed. This indicates that we only need to obtain 
the maximum of the numerator on RHS of (36). Let
F v t v t v v v t v v va a a a a a a a a a aAUb m= - + -lr r r r^ ^ ^^ ^ ^h h hh h h, 
,v 0a 3! + h6 .
Obviously, F va^ h is continuous in domain, so F va^ h 
has the maximum within ,v v0a a! r6 @ as long as we can 
obtain F v 0a #l^ h  under the condition v va a$ r . It is easy 
to obtain F v t v v t v t v v t va a a a a a a a a a abm= + - -l l lr r r^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h 
and F v t v v t v2a a a a a a=- -m l m^ ^ ^h h h. If t va a^ h is con-
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vex, monotone increasing function, then we have 
F v 0a #m^ h , when v v 0a a$ $r . This means F al^ h 
decreases with the variable ,v va a 3! +r h6 . Since 
F v v t v1 0a a a a #bm= -l lr r r^ ^ ^h h h , we get F v F v 0a a# #l l r^ ^h h  
under the condition v va a$ r . Thus we conclude that in 
(36) the maximum is obtained within ,v0 ar6 @.
For each given class of link travel cost function L 
(a family of linear cost functions or polynomials of a 
certain degree), let
, , , , , ,maxL t v v






{ b m { b m=
! !
r r^ ^h h. (37)
with the definitions (36) and (37), we have
, , .
v t v t v
v t v v v L T
a
SO
a a a a
SO
a A




















The upper bound of the fourth term on RHS of (35) 
can be obtained by solving the following maximization 
problem using the method in [6].
Lemma 2 - Consider the following maximization 
problem
,max lnZ y x C




















/ , ,x y 0i i $ , , , ,i n1 2 f= , (40)
where C 02  is a constant. The optimal value of 
this problem is Z kCmax = , where k solves equation 
ke n 1k 1 = -+ ^ h, with e being the base of natural loga-
rithm.
From Lemma 2, we can obtain
ln d




















h h/ , (41)
where kw  solves k e R 1w k w1w = -+ , w W! . Substitut-
ing (38) and (41) into (35), it yields
, ,T T L T k d1 1mix SO mix w w
w W











be the total stochastic traffic demand in network and
k D






r ^ h/ ,
then (42) can be rewritten as
, ,T T L T kD1mix SO mix# { b m
i











as the actual average travel cost of all network users at 
system optimum, then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 - For a given separable link travel cost 
function class L. Let each instance t v La a !^ h  being a 
differentiable, convex and monotonically increasing 
function of the aggregate link flow va. Let , , , ,G d t b m^ h 
be a mixed instance associated with AU and LSU. If 
Tmix  is the total actual travel cost at the mixed equilib-
rium, and TSO  is the minimum total actual travel cost, 
then






















Theorem 1 states that the upper bound of the ef-
ficiency loss for the mixed equilibrium associated with 
AU and LSU in transportation network with fixed de-
mand depends on six parameters, namely , ,L{ b m^ h, 
i , kr , cr , b , m. Parameter , ,L 1#{ b m^ h  is a dimension-
less number of the efficiency loss depending on the 
link travel cost functions, the altruism coefficient and 
the demand ratio. The upper bound of the efficiency 
loss is a monotonically increasing function of , ,L{ b m^ h. 
Parameter i  in its original meaning is related to the 
standard error of the distribution of the perceived path 
travel costs [20], and the Logit-based model assumes 






where v  is the common standard deviation of the per-
ceived path travel costs. The upper bound of the inef-
ficiency is a monotonically decreasing function of i . 
When " 3i + ,
, , , , , ,G Ld t 1
1#t b m
{ b m-^ ^h h
then the model becomes the partly uniform altruism 
traffic assignment problem. Parameter kr  is a dimen-
sionless coefficient increasing with the number of 
feasible paths and thus reflects the degree of network 
complexity. Equation (44) also states that the upper 











then the upper bound of the efficiency loss decreases 
with the actual average travel cost and increases with 
the total traffic demand. Parameter m is the demand 
ratio of the altruism users in the transportation net-
work. The upper bound of the efficiency loss is a mono-











which is the result in [6], when 1m = ,
,L1
1#t
{ b- ^ h ,
thus the model becomes a completely uniform altru-
ism traffic assignment, which is the result in [22].
The efficiency loss bound given in Theorem 1 is the 
worst-case measure for the mixed equilibrium model, 
taking over all the possible instances. In fact, the ac-
tual ratio of the total cost at equilibrium to the SO total 
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cost can be substantially small. Indeed, in transporta-
tion network, the free-flow travel cost is usually not a 
negligible fraction. Considering this, we can present a 
parameterized and improved bound on the equilibrium 
inefficiency, as done by Correa et al. in [3].
Theorem 2 - For a given separable link travel 
cost function class L. Let each instance t v La a !^ h  
being a differentiable, convex and monotonically in-
creasing function of the aggregate link flow va and 
t t t vv0a a a a0 0 $ h= r r^ ^ ^h h h for all a A!  with constant 
v0 1# #h r^ h . Let , , , ,G d t b m^ h be a mixed instance as-
sociated with AU and LSU. If Tmix  is the total actual 
travel cost at the mixed equilibrium, and TSO  is the 
minimum total actual travel cost, then



































5. EFFICIENCY LOSS EXAMPLE  
OF MIXED EQUILIBRIUM ASSOCIATED 
WITH AU AND LSU
Consider a directed graph consisting of two nodes 
and two links (Figure 1).
According to (14) and (15), the mixed equilibrium is 
obtained by solving the following equations simultane-
ously:
. .v v v1 1 1 1 0AU LSU AU AU1 1 1n+ - =^ h , 
. .v v1 1 1 1 0AU LSU AU1 1 $n+ - .

































The mixed equilibrium solution is .v 0 8AU1 =r , v 0AU2 =r , 
.v 0 1048LSU1 =r , .v 0 0952LSU2 =r , .0 9953AUn = . The ag-
gregate link flow is .v 0 90481 =r , .v 0 09522 =r  which 
generates the system total travel cost 0.9139. Thus, 
the efficiency loss is
.
. .0 75
0 9139 1 2185t = = .
Based on definition









v a a a












r r r r
^
^
^ ^^ ^ ^
h
h
h hh h h
and t v1 1= , t 12 = , we can obtain
, , , ,
. .
. . . . .max
t v v
v v v
0 9048 0 9048
0 9048 0 1 0 9048 1 0 8 0 8
AU LSU
v














while .v 0 48861 =  the problem (46) reaches at the 
maximum .0 20321{ = . It is easy to obtain that 02{ = . 
Then, , , , .maxL 0 20321 2{ b m { {= =^ h " , . Because kw  
satisfies equation k e R 1 2 1 1w k w1w = - = - =+ , then 
.k 0 2785w = . It is easy to obtain that .k 0 2785=r  by
k D























Thus, the bound becomes
, , .L c
k
1
1 1 1 1 34821t















according to Theorem 1.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the efficiency loss in a 
transportation network associated with AU and LSU. A 
variational inequality model is presented to formulate 
the route choice behaviours associated with AU and 
LSU with fixed demand. The analytical results show 
that the upper bounds of the efficiency loss of mixed 




Figure 1 - The network used in the example
The link travel cost functions are defined as t v1 1= , 
t 12 = , respectively. There is one OD pair with fixed de-
mand d 1= . Supposing demand ratio .0 8m = , altru-
ism coefficient .0 1b = , parameter 1i = .
According to (31), the SO link flow solution can be 
obtained by solving the following minimization prob-
lem:
min v v1 2 2+^ h
s.t. v v 11 2+ =
,v v 01 2 $
The optimal solution is .v 0 5SO1 = , 0.5vSO2 =  and 
the total travel cost is 0.75.
The perceived cost of AU on link a in the network 
is t t v v t vaAU a a a a ab= + l^ ^h h. In this example the altruism 
coefficient .0 1b =  and t v1 1= , t 12 = . Path 1 is the 
link 1 and path 2 is the link 2. So the perceived cost 
of AU on path i, ,i 1 2=  is the perceived cost on link 
i, ,i 1 2= , i.e., .t v v v v0 1 1AU AU LSU AU LSU1 1 1 1 1$ $= + + + =^ h  
. .v v1 1 1 1AU LSU1 1= + , .t v v1 0 1 0 1AU AU LSU2 2 2$ $= + + =^ h . 
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tion, the altruism coefficient, the demand ratio, the 
network complexity, the travel demand and the degree 
of travel perception error on travel cost. It is shown that 
our result takes the results in [6] and [22] as its spe-
cial cases. Our ongoing work is to explore the efficiency 
loss of mixed equilibrium associated with AU and LSU 
in transportation network with elastic demand.
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